Aristotle on Necessary Principles and on Explaining X through X’s essence by Angioni, Lucas
Aristotle on Necessary Principles and on
Explaining Xrough the Essence of X
Lucas Angioni
Department of Philosophy, University of Campinas
I discuss what Aristotle means when he say that scientic demonstration must pro-
ceed from necessary principles. I argue that, for Aristotle, scientic demonstra-
tion should not be reduced to sound deduction with necessary premises. Scientic
demonstration ultimately depends on the fully appropriate explanatory factor for a
given explanandum.is explanatory factor is what makes the explanandum what
it is. Consequently, this factor is also unique. When Aristotle says that demonstra-
tion must proceed from necessary principles, he means that each demonstration
requires the principle that is the necessary one for the fully appropriate explanation
of its explanandum.is picture also provides a key to understand Aristotle’s thesis
that scientic explanation depends on essences: it is the essence of the attribute to
be explained (rather then the essence of the subject-term within the explanandum)
that should be stated as the fully appropriate explanatory factor.
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1. Introduction
Recent discussions of the explanatory role of essences in Aristotle’s essen-
tialism have focused on the ability of the essence of X to explain (at least
some of) the necessary properties of X.1 One point is crucial in these dis-
cussions: whatAristotlemeans inPosteriorAnalytics (henceforthAPo)when
he says that the principle for a scientic demonstration must be necessary.
I will argue that what he means is that the principle is the one required for
the fully appropriate explanation of a given explanandum.is unorthodox
reading allows that, in some cases, the essence of a subject will not on its
Corresponding author’s address: Lucas Angioni, University of Campinas, Department
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own deliver the fully appropriate explanation for some of its features, even if
it contributes to that explanation. Instead, the fully appropriate explanation
will be delivered either by the essence of the feature itself or by the essence
of the explanandum as such.is account of the notion of a necessary prin-
ciple has several philosophical advantages: it pays attention to the dierent
ways in which Aristotle talks about necessity, allows us to attain a consis-
tent overall picture of Aristotle’s project in APo, and avoids charging him
with blatantly false views when discussing the role of necessity in scientic
explanations.
2. Ways of Talking about Necessity and Necessary Items
2.1 Necessity-1
One of the ways in which Aristotle talks about necessity in APo involves the
necessary character of the consequence captured in a demonstration. is
notion of necessity clearly relates to the mere logical passage from premises
to conclusion, which, far from being specic to scientic demonstration, is
a general trait of each valid deduction. It is an important question whether
Aristotle’s notion of syllogistic consequence can be fully analysed as a mere
logical consequence or relies on some extra-logical requirements, but I need
not discuss this question in any detail2 because it is clear that it is not in-
cluded among the characteristic features in virtue of which a syllogism is
turned into a scientic demonstration (see APo 71b23–24, 74b15–18).
2.2 Necessity-2
Another way in which Aristotle talks about necessity or necessary items in
APo is related to the necessary character of the sentences that constitute a
demonstration. Scholars have argued that the notion of a necessity sentence
should be understood as a specic sort of predicative tie, instead of being
generated by some kind of propositional modal operator applied to a previ-
ous sentence.3 is notion of a necessary sentence plays a role in Aristotle’s
project in APo, but it is not the most important feature of it. It is probably
correct to say that a scientic demonstration must be constituted of sen-
tences which are necessarily true.4 Yet, being constituted of necessary sen-
tences is not sucient for turning a sound syllogism into a demonstration.
Nonetheless, Aristotle seems to be saying so at APo 74b15–18:
2 For discussion see (Corkum forthcoming).
3 (Malink 2013, 27).
4 I say “probably” as a way of pointing to the problem of sentences that are true not nec-
essarily but for the most part (see I 30, 87b21–25; II.12, 96a8–19). See section (3.5) about
this.
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(T1) erefore, the syllogism must proceed from necessary [items], from true
[items] you candeducewithout demonstrating, but fromnecessary [items]
you cannot deduce without demonstrating—this is precisely the mark of
demonstration. (74b15–18, Barnes’s translation slightly modied).
As Barnes (1993, 126) has pointed out, Aristotle seems to be committed to
the false proposition that “if P is inferred from Π, and Π is necessary, then P
is demonstrated”.5 Now, my interpretation does not commit Aristotle to this
false proposition. Let me call it henceforth BFP (Barnes’s False Proposition).
And the key to understanding how Aristotle is not committed to BFP is to
realize that his talk about the “necessity of the principles” in APo does not
focus on the notion of a necessary predicative sentence.
2.3 Necessity-3
Aristotle in APo also talks about the necessary character of the principles
from which a demonstration must proceed (74b5–6). Most scholars seem to
conate this third way with the second one.6ey think the necessary char-
acter of a principle collapses into its necessary truth as a sentence. If prin-
ciples are interpreted as predicative sentences, their necessity qua principles
amounts (according to those scholars) to the necessity of the predicative re-
lation between its subject and its predicate. But, inmy view, this conation is
wrong and, besides other things, it cannot avoid attributingBFP to Aristotle.
My claim is that, even if it is indeed true that the predicative relation between
the subject and the predicate is a necessary one when a given predicative
sentence is a principle for a demonstration, this is not the point Aristotle is
making when he urges that demonstrations must proceed from necessary
principles (74b15–18 = T1, 71b12, 73a24, 74b5–6, 75a12–15, 88b31–32).
e third way in which Aristotle talks about necessary items in APo in-
troduces the notion of a principle that is the necessary one for the fully ap-
propriate explanation of a given explanandum. is notion of a necessary
principle is compatible with the necessary character of the sentences that
constitute a demonstration. What is labelled a necessary principle might
itself be a necessary predicative sentence. However, the necessity at stake,
when such a sentence is labelled a necessary principle, cannot be reduced to
(and understood in terms of) the necessary truth of its predicative tie. e
necessity attributed to a demonstrative principle as a principle rests on the
notions of explanatory relevance and full explanatory appropriateness. Be-
5 is proposition is false because it states that Necessity-2 is sucient for demonstrations.
See (Mignucci 2007, 171), (Hankinson 1998, 161).
6 (Barnes 1993, 125–127), (Ross 1949, 528), (McKirahan 1992, 125–126), (Mignucci 2007, 171),
(Lloyd 1981, 158), (Burnyeat 1981, 110).
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ing a necessary principle amounts to being the principle that is the necessary
one for attaining the fully appropriate explanation of a given explanandum.
is way of understanding the notion of a necessary principle avoids charg-
ing Aristotle with BFP: “if P is inferred from Π, and Π is necessary, then P
is demonstrated”. What Aristotle is saying at 74b15–18 is rather that “if P is
inferred from Π, and Π is what is strictly necessary for the fully appropriate
explanation, then P is demonstrated”.
Before discussing some of the key passages in support of the view that
Aristotle is committed to such a notion of Necessity-3, I should stress—to
forestall confusion about terminology—that the notion of a fully appropri-
ate explanation of a given explanandum is exactly Aristotle’s notion of scien-
tic demonstration. Aristotle’s demonstrations cannot be reduced to sound
deductions concerned with justifying and certifying our beliefs about the
truth of a given proposition.7 Aristotle’s demonstrations are not even pri-
marily concerned with establishing in the rst place that some problematic
sentences are true. I add that a strictly scientic demonstration—which ex-
presses scientic knowledge simpliciter (71b9–12, cf. 74a32–33, 76a13–15)—
cannot be satised with some reasonable explanation. e essential fea-
ture of a demonstration is to display the most relevant explanatory factor
of a given explanandum that is already assumed to be the case.8 And the
most relevant explanatory factor—which is indeed unique—is a cause (in
the Aristotelian sense of “cause”) that makes the explanandumwhat it is. Let
it be clear, then, that I use here the words “demonstration” and “explanation”
according to the picture outlined in this and the next section.
3. e Notion of a Necessary Principle
3.1 Bearers of the Adjective “Necessary”
It is important to stress that, when Necessity-3 is involved, the bearers of the
adjective “necessary” (or equivalent expressions, like “cannot be otherwise”,
71a12) in Aristotle’s Greek are items such as “principles” (74b5–6), “middle
term” (75a13), “premise” (89a4) and—more controversially—causal relations
(71b10–12).ere are explicit occurrences of expressions such as “necessary
principles” (74b5–6) and “necessary middle term” (75a13), but I hold that
also many absolute occurrences of the adjective “necessary” (with no sub-
stantive uncontroversially implied in the context) must be taken in the same
way inAPo I.6. More precisely, the expression “ex anankaion” at 74b15, 17, 18
and 26 (as well as at 73a24) points to the same claim made at the beginning
7 See (Taylor 1990, 116–117), (Kosman 1973), (Burnyeat 1981, 108–115), (McKirahan 1992, 26–
32), (Matthen 1981, 4–10), (Fine 2010), (Lesher 2001, 46), (Goldin 2013).
8 A similar conception can be found in (Koslicki 2012, 189, 194–201).
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of APo I.6, namely, that a scientic demonstration must proceed from prin-
ciples that are necessary qua principles for the intended explanation. Re-
member that at 74b15 we nd the rst sentence of T1, which, if interpreted
in terms ofNecessity-2, generatesBFP. I have suggested that T1 should be in-
terpreted in terms of Necessity-3 in order to avoid BFP.us, Aristotle’s use
of the expression “ex anankaion” is consistent in all those passages in APo
I.6 (some of them will be discussed below). His use of this expression does
not introduce the requirement that a demonstration must be constituted of
necessary predicative sentences (even if Aristotle does accept this require-
ment). It rather introduces a requirement about the appropriateness of an
explanatory principle as a principle. I will discuss the key passages in section
3.5, but rst I will clarify the notion of Necessity-3 further, and explain why
this notion does not commit Aristotle to any blatantly false proposition like
BFP.
3.2 e Use of “Necessary” as Adjective of “Principle”
When the adjective “necessary” in Aristotle’s Greek is connected with the
term “principles” (74b5–6), it takes the principle at stake as a principle and
indicates a specic way in which the principle performs its function as a
principle in a given explanatory context. Aer all, the bearer of the complex
predicate “necessary principle” is a sentence S. But sentence S is not called
“necessary”, and then, a “principle”, as if these two predicates were indepen-
dent of each other and just happened to be lumped together.e application
of the predicate “necessary” to a sentence S, in this case, presupposes the prior
application of the predicate “principle” to the same sentence. A sentence S is
called a principle with regard to the explanatory work it performs in a given
explanatory context; the second predicate “necessary” is, then, applied to the
same sentence S, but taking S as a principle and indicating the specic way
in which it is a principle.
A comparison with a case explicitly discussed by Aristotle might be in
order here. As the adjective “good” in the composite predicate “good cob-
bler” presupposes that its subject is a cobbler and indicates a specic way
in which she exercises her ability as a cobbler,9 so also the adjective “nec-
essary” in the expression “necessary principle” presupposes that its subject
is a principle and indicates a specic way in which it performs its role as a
principle. erefore, as the correct paraphrase of “good cobbler” when ap-
9 On Interpretation, 20b31–36. It is hard to understand Aristotle’s point (see Ackrill 1963,
146–148), but what is important to me is his acknowledgement at 20b35–36 that “good
cobbler” is not used as an equivalent to a sum of predicates in which both “good” and
“cobbler” would preserve the same meaning they have when applied separately to a given
subject.
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plied to Victoria will be something like “Victoria is good at mending shoes
etc” (rather than “Victoria is able to mend shoes and is a very good char-
acter of a person”), so also the correct paraphrase of “necessary principle”
when applied to a given sentence S will be something like “S is the principle
necessary for the fully appropriate explanation of that explanandum” (rather
than “S has some explanatory power in a given context and is a necessarily
true sentence”). Note that it might be true that Victoria is a person of good
character, and that the sentence S is necessarily true. However, these truths
are not part of the meaning of the expressions at stake. Even if Victoria is
a good person, when someone says that she is a good cobbler, he is saying
that Victoria is good (i.e., skillfull, ecient) at mending shoes. In the same
way, even if a sentence S is necessarily true, when a scientist declares that S is
the necessary principle for a demonstration, she is saying that the sentence
S is the principle necessary for the fully appropriate explanation of a given
explanandum.10
e same applies to “necessary middle term”. e meaning of this ex-
pression at 75a13 is not “a middle term that is necessarily attributed to its
subject”, even if it happens to be necessarily attributed to its subject. e
expression “necessary middle term” takes the middle term as a middle term
or, more precisely, as a demonstrative middle term (i.e. as introducing an
explanatory claim in an intended demonstration) and indicates the way in
which this middle term performs its job as an explanatory middle term.e
expression means that the middle term is the necessary one for the fully ap-
propriate explanation of its explanandum.11
3.3 e Triadic Structure Involved in a Necessary Principle
e explanatory context involved in the use of “necessary principle” has a
threefold structure.e explanandum as such (even if one can refer to it in
the ordinary language by means of a nominal expression) must be formu-
lated as a predicative relation between a subject and an attribute. What one
wishes to explain is, for instance, why a certain kind of noise occurs in the
10 Other cases in which the adjective “necessary” has nothing to do with being necessarily
true are found in Topics (155b19, 20, 29, 36; 156a10; 157a12; 159a20; maybe 162b1; 161b29)
and Prior Analytics (42a39; 47a19; 53a35; 66a36). To call a given sentence S “a necessary
premise” (as at 155b19) amounts to saying that S is the premise required (in a given argu-
mentative context) for the intended valid conclusion.
11 A similar story holds for 74b29–30: Aristotle is saying that “the middle term B is not nec-
essarily [sc. the middle term for the appropriate demonstration]; [. . . ] for it is possible
[sc. for that middle term actually used in the attempted demonstration] not to be [sc. the
middle term in the desired explanation, namely, the one that captures the why]”. I will skip
the convoluted paragraph 75a1–11, but I submit that all occurrences of “necessary middle
term” (75a2, 4, 8–9) can still be understood in the same way as the occurrence at 75a13.
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clouds, or why being long-lived is attributed to quadrupeds, or why being
mortal is attributed to humans.ere is an ordinary name for the occurrence
of this kind of noise in the clouds, “thunder”, while there is no ordinary name
for the occurrence of the attribute long-lived in quadrupeds. But this latter
fact does not aect the possibility of introducing the explanandum through a
nominal expression like “quadruped’s longevity”.e important point is that
behind the nominal expression there is a complex structure which should be
articulated by means of a predicative tie. Every explanandum should be cast
in the predicative formula “why does A belong to C”.12
In reference to this predicative explanandum, the necessary-3 principle
is understood as a middle term B in the syllogistic framework13 of explana-
tory demonstrations. is middle term introduces a more basic attribute
that, belonging to the same subject C, makes C have the attribute to be ex-
plained, A. With regard to these features I hold that the notion of a necessary
principle is triadic, not dyadic.14 e relevant contrast is with the notion of
a necessary predicative sentence which ismerely dyadic: a given sentence S’s
being a necessary-2 sentence is a matter of how its predicate is related to its
subject, so that one can ascertain whether or not S is necessary-2 by focus-
ing only on that predicative tie.ere is no need to consider the relation of
S to other sentences. But a middle term’s being a necessary-3 principle is a
matter of how the middle term is related to a given explanandum which is
itself formulated as a predication.e middle term B is a predicate that be-
longs to C, but what makes it a demonstrative middle term is its explaining
why C has the attribute A, and this explanatory work depends not only on
the predicative tie between B and its subject C, but also on the predicative
tie and the explanatory relation between B and A. Consequently, in order
12 See (Williams and Charles 2013, 123), (Charles 2010, 289–296), (Charles 2000, 213–220).
From now on, I will follow standard use of “A” for the attribute to be explained, “C” for
the subject of which that attribute is predicated, and “B” for the middle term explaining
why A belongs to C.
13 I will not discusswhether the syllogistic framework is suited toAristotle’s notion of demon-
stration. e standard anti-syllogism position is found in (Barnes 1981). For discussion,
see (McKirahan 1992, 25, 149–163), (Smith 1984), (Ferejohn 1994, 83–84). My view is that
(i) demonstrations are concerned with capturing the appropriate explanatory factor for
an explanandum expressed in predicative form, (ii) such explanations can be cast in the
triadic framework of syllogisms, (iii) so the syllogistic framework is thereby suited to
demonstrations—even if syllogisms are not suited as a tool for scientic research.
14 I use “dyadic” here, in contrast with “triadic”, in attention to the fact that an Aristotelian
predicative sentence is a dyadic tie between a predicate and a subject (see APr 24a16–17).
My usage has nothing to do with predicates like “being the father of ”, which is a “dyadic
predicate” in the sense that it must be applied to two subjects in order to get a complete
sentence. e same holds of my usage of “triadic”: I am highlighting the fact that an ex-
planation has a threefold structure, so that an explanatory factor cannot be designated
without taking into account the triplet of terms involved in that structure.
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to ascertain that a given middle term B is a necessary-3 principle, one can-
not restrict her focus on the predicative tie of B and its subject C with no
attention to the attribute Awhich the middle term as a principle is meant to
explain. One must rather focus on the triadic relation between the middle
term B and the predicative explanandum, CA.15
3.4 Explanandum-sensitiveness
e notion of a necessary principle is explanandum-sensitive. For a given
explanandum CA, a given middle term might be the necessary principle—
the principle required for the fully appropriate explanation of that explanan-
dum. However, nothing guarantees that the same middle term will preserve
its character of necessary principle for a dierent explanandum CA* (the
attribute A* being dierent from A).
is point is highly important for a more ne-grained understanding of
the explanatory role of essential predicates. In most versions of Aristotle’s
essentialism, essential predicates are charged with the responsibility of ex-
plaining on their own most of the necessary predicates of their subjects.16 I
will argue that their essentiality might still be insucient for the fully appro-
priate explanation ofwhy their subject has ormust have someof its necessary
features.
A full analysis of what being a necessary principle amounts to is beyond
the scope of this paper.17 For my purposes, it is enough to characterize the
notion of a necessary principle—the principle delivering the fully appropri-
ate explanation of its explanandum—with three features: (a) being able to
guarantee (in the appropriate context) a sound deduction of its explanan-
dum;18 (b) being also a sine qua non condition for its explanandum to obtain;
15 I will write CA (instead of AC) to depict the pragma consisting in A being attributed to
C. Nothing important hinges on the order between C and A, I just prefer CA because it is
nearer to formulae in ordinary language.
16 In some versions of essentialism, essential predicates are discharged of that responsibility:
the explanation of the necessary predicates of a subject is not performed by the subject’s
essence on its own, but also requires the essences of others objects involved in the explana-
tory story. See (Peramatzis n.d.) and (Koslicki 2012, 202–206). However, these versions do
not account for the case which seems to be central in Book II of APo, namely, the case in
which A’s essence or CA’s essence (for instance, thunder’s essence) is the necessary prin-
ciple.
17 Full analysis of this subject will require close examination of Aristotle’s criteria for explana-
tory appropriateness in APo I.4–5, I.7, I.9 and I.13, with discussion of other interrelated
points like coextensive katholou predicates, the notion of suggeneia (“appropriate related-
ness”), the relevance operator “as such”, the primitiveness of the primary cause, etc.
18 e appropriate context is already encapsulated in the fact that the term at stake is taken
as a demonstrative middle term, which implies that (i) it has a predicative connection with
C, (ii) it has a predicative connection with A, (iii) it has some claim for being the cause of
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(c) being the exactly appropriate explanatory factor that makes its explanan-
dum be what it is. In order to be a necessary principle, an explanatory fac-
tor (expressed as a middle term in a syllogism) must display all these three
features.19 Note that the feature (c) is such that its fullment entails the ful-
lment of both other features, i.e. (a) and (b). If a middle term B is the
appropriate explanatory factor that makes its explanandum what it is, it is
thereby a sine qua non condition for its explanandum to obtain and guaran-
tees a sound deduction of it.e real advantage of unpacking the notion of a
necessary-3 principle into these three features is that it helps us understand
what is wrong when a seemingly good explanation is not the most appropri-
ate one.
A few foil examples are in order. I will rst consider a case in which the
three requirements are fullled, and then contrast it with the case in which
two requirements are not met. Take C as “human” and B as “rational an-
imal”. Take A as “capable of becoming literate”. On Aristotle’s view, being
a rational animal is an essential feature that appropriately explains human’s
capability of becoming literate. Now, consider another explanandum with a
very dierent attribute: let A be “mortal”. If we grant that the most appro-
priate explanation must pick up the explanatory factor that precisely makes
its explanandum what it is, and if we grant that mortality depends, on Aris-
totle’s view, precisely (and ultimately) on facts about the elemental matter
that constitute sublunary living beings (cf. De Caelo 288b15–18), we can see
that being a rational animal is not any more the most appropriate explana-
tion for humanmortality. Humanmortality has some important connection
with human essence as rational animals. However, being a rational animal
is not the most relevant explanatory factor that makes mortality be what it
is (i.e., mortality does not depend primarily on human rationality for being
what it is) and, besides, being a rational animal is not even a sine qua non
condition for being mortal: humans could still be mortal even if they were
not rational animals.20 us, requirements (b) and (c) described above are
C’s being A.ese remarks avoid some problems addressed by Koslicki (2012, 194), when
she argues that the inference from her (2.a) to her (2.b) will not be logically valid without
supplying an auxiliary premise.
19 Features (a) and (b) taken together amount to the requirement that a principle must be a
necessary and sucient condition for its explanandum to obtain. Put in syllogistic frame-
work, this requirement is equivalent to the requirement that themiddle termmust be coex-
tensive with the major term. Now, Aristotle argues very carefully that conditions (a) and
(b) together are not enough for an appropriate explanans (APo I.13). See (Koslicki 2012,
198–199), (McKirahan 1992, 214–216), (Charles 2010, 308).is point only stresses the im-
portance of feature (c), which is not reducible to any extensional feature of the relations
between the three terms.
20OnAristotle’s view, humanswill not be humans if theywere not rational animals. However,
this would not prevent Aristotle from engaging in counterfactuals designed to highlight
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not satised in this case.
Before exploring some further points, consider another foil example,
Aristotle’s case of two lines perpendicular to a third line (APo 74a13–16).
Take C as “two lines cutting a third line”, A as “do not meet” and B as “pro-
ducing right angles as they cut the third line”. Now, B’s being attributed to
C is enough for soundly deducing that A is attributed to C;21 aer all, given
that those lines produce right angles as they cut the third line, they do not
meet. Nonetheless, producing right angles is not the appropriate feature to
explain why those lines do not meet each other (cf. Barnes 1993, 123). It is
not important for the explanation that the angles produced are right ones; if
those lines produced acute or obtuse angles, it would remain true that they
do not meet each other, provided that the two angles are equal to each other
in any way. Aristotle’s point is that producing right angles does not deliver
themost appropriate explanation: the fully appropriate explanation requires
the angles to be equal to each other in whatever way, and that is all. And
“being equal to each other in whatever way” does not include any mention
of specic ways in which the two given angles are equal to each other, e.g.
by being right (or acute or obtuse) angles. e explanandum at stake does
not primarily depend on the angles being right (nor does it depend on the
angles being acute or obtuse). e necessary principle, in this case, will be
“producing angles (as they cut the third line) equal to each other in whatever
way”.22
Another example: take C as “isosceles triangle”, A as “2R” (i.e., “having
the sum of its internal angles equal to two right angles”) and B as “being a
rectilinear plane gure enclosed by three lineswith two sides (or angles) equal
to each other”. Now, the Barbara-NNN relating these three terms would, of
course, deliver a sound deduction of the predicative sentence taken as ex-
planandum, but the part of the B-term which I have put in italics smuggles
an irrelevant factor into the explanation. at isosceles triangles are isosce-
les, i.e., have two sides (and two angles) equal to each other, is not relevant
for them in order to have 2R.e fully appropriate explanation of the pred-
icate 2R applied to its proper subject requires only the features that make
the subject a triangle, sc. a rectilinear plane gure enclosed by three lines.
that rational animal is not even a sine qua non condition for mortality to obtain. Aristotle
uses such counterfactuals when he discusses some features of primary causes in APo I.13,
78b16–17.
21 What I mean by “being enough for soundly deducing” is “being enough for soundly de-
ducing in the appropriate circumstance, namely, with the aid of the major premise which
disentangles the entailing relation from B to A”. Now, this appropriate circumstance is
already encapsulated in the fact that B is taken as the middle term.
22is is clearly what Aristotle intends with “in so far as they are equal in any way at all” at
74a16 (even if some details of the proof he has in mind are obscure). See (Barnes 1993, 123).
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Consequently, in this case, being a rectilinear plane gure enclosed by three
lines will be the necessary principle for explaining why isosceles triangles
have 2R (cf. APo 85b4–13).23
Now, it is important to remark that, in the three foil examples above,
the middle terms “rational animal”, “producing right angles as they cut the
third line” and “being a rectilinear plane gure enclosed by three lines with
two sides (or angles) equal to each other” are similar as middle terms for
the intended explanations. All those terms, as middle terms (i) are essen-
tial predicates of their respective subjects and introduce theirwhole essence;
(ii) deliver a sound deduction of the predication assumed as explanandum;
(iii) but, in advancing the whole essence of their subjects as explanatory fac-
tors, fail to present the most appropriate explanation of their respective ex-
plananda.
What is wrong with the explanations delivered by those middle terms,
which are essential predicates of their respective subjects? Among require-
ments (a)–(c) for being a necessary-3 principle, those middle terms satisfy
only (a): they ensure a sound deduction of their explananda. But they do
not even count as a sine qua non condition for their explananda to obtain,
i.e. requirement (b) is not met, let alone as the fully appropriate explanatory
factor for them, i.e. requirement (c) is not fullled either. ey still deliver
some good explanation for their explananda, but this is not enough on Aris-
totle’s view: in order to count them as necessary-3 principles, Aristotle wants
them to deliver the most appropriate explanation.
Requirement (c) is basic: a middle termmust be the exactly appropriate
explanatory factor that makes its explanandum CA (not its subject C) what
it is. Aristotle is focusing on what the explanandum exactly is rather than on
the sole essence of the subject C.is is Aristotle’s meaning when he applies
the Greek expressions normally translated as “in itself ” (or “as such”) to the
“object” of scientic knowledge. Now, “object” might be misleading here: it
might lead us to believe that Aristotle’s focus is on the subject C. However,
it is rather the pragma CA that counts as “what one is concerned with sci-
entically knowing”.24 And what is a pragma in itself or as such? Even if
23ings are a little more complicated than that, because Aristotle insists that isosceles trian-
gle is not the most appropriate subject for 2R (in APo I 4–5, for instance, in 74a2–3, 16–17,
32–b1). For my purposes, though, it is enough to consider Aristotle’s discussion in APo
I.24: if your demonstration has started with isosceles as its subject, then it is preferable to
avoid selecting its specic description (“as isosceles”) as the explanatory factor (85b5–7).
My paraphrase of 85b5–7 is the following: “since 2R belongs [sc. to isosceles] not as isosce-
les but as triangle, the knower who knows because it is isosceles has less knowledge [of the
explanandum as such—of what the explanandum exactly is in itself ] than the knower who
knows because it is triangle”—“hoti” at 85b6, 7 is “because”, not “that”, pace Barnes.
24e term “pragma” is used in the sense of explanandum with predicative structure in APo
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both C and A are important factors in settling this question (for they are the
elements of the pragma CA), the attribute A plays the most important role
in determining what the explanandum is qua the explanandum at stake. If
I wish to explain “human mortality”, I am thereby concerned with explain-
ing facts about humans in general, but I am more precisely concerned with
one specic fact among those, namely, the one about mortality. us, the
application of Greek expressions equivalent to “as such” (or “in itself ”) to
explananda has the eect of highlighting (or giving expression to) the re-
quirement (c). If I aim at scientically explaining why C is A, I should focus
onwhatA is exactly as such. Mymiddle term Bmust (rst of all) encapsulate
what A is in itself, and the encapsulating feature might not be C’s essence.
When Aristotle says that “necessary [items] are what belong to an object
(pragma) in itself ” (74b6–7), he means that “necessary [principles] are what
belong to explananda in themselves”. us, to return to my foil examples,
when I pick up animal rationality as human essential feature to explain why
humans are mortal, I miss the most relevant factor that makes mortality (for
humans as well as for other objects) what it is. I have thereby some explana-
tion of my explanandum, but not the most appropriate one and, therefore,
not the scientic one. Similarly, when I pick up isosceles triangle’s denition
to explain why isosceles triangle has 2R, I do not express thereby any un-
derstanding that this attribute does not depend on any specic feature of the
sides and angles of a triangle, but only on any triangle’s being a three-sided
rectilinear gure.
3.5 Aristotle’s Commitment to Necessity-3
e best evidence to show that Aristotle is committed to the notion of Ne-
cessity-3 is T1, which is quoted in section 2.2. If we invoke Necessity-2 in
our interpretation of T1, we cannot avoid charging Aristotle with BFP: “If
P is inferred from Π, and Π is necessary, then P is demonstrated” (Barnes
1993, 126). Since this proposition, besides being clearly false, is not consis-
tent with many other things Aristotle says about demonstration in APo, a
dierent interpretation for T1 seems to be needed. I am providing such an
interpretation with the notion of Necessity-3.25
71b11, 91b14, 93a22, 98b30 (more controversially: 73b28, 74b7; APr 46a25). Cf. (Burnyeat
2011, 19, footnote 57).
25 BFP will be incompatible with (i) Aristotle’s insistence on the six requirements introduced
at 71b20–32, among which the causality requirement occupies the rst rank, as well as his
insistence that (ii) premises in a demonstrationmust express per se predicative ties (73b16–
18, 75a29–31), (iii) principles should be suggenes with (appropriately related to) their ex-
plananda (75b3–12, 76a8–9, 29–30), (iv) scientic explanation should state the principles
of the explanandum as such (75b36–40, 76a4–7), and (v) scientic explanation requires
appropriate principles (71b22–23, 72a5–6, 74b25–26).
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However, one might argue that Aristotle consistently employs the no-
tion of necessity in APo along the lines of Necessity-2.e key chapter, APo
I.6, seems to insist that demonstrative premises should be necessarily true.
Aristotle’s remarks at the opening of APo I.4 also seem to invoke the no-
tion of necessarily true premises. Besides, Aristotle’s denition of scientic
knowledge inAPo I. 2 seems to attribute necessity to the proposition that one
comes to know scientically. I will now address these exegetical diculties.
First of all, I should emphasize that I am not banishing necessary sen-
tences from Aristotle’s theory of demonstration. e triadic notion of a
necessary-3 principle is compatible with the standard view that a demon-
strative sentence is necessarily true, i.e. true by Necessity-2. Only middle
terms asmiddle terms can qualify as necessary principles in the triadic sense;
but when cast in the predicative sentences in which they are related to the
extremes, the middle terms can still deliver sentences which are themselves
necessarily true. is is exactly what happens with “rational animal” as a
middle term attributed to humans in order to explain their capability of be-
coming literate (one of my key examples in the previous sections).us, an
advantage of my account is that it makes sense of otherwise vexing things
Aristotle says about “necessary principles” (in T1 and elsewhere) without
abandoning the importance of Necessity-2 for demonstrative knowledge.
A goodway of exploring this point is to discuss the occurrence of “neces-
sity” terminology in the beginning of APo I.4. In the central passages of this
chapter, Aristotle does indeed deal with the standard notion of a necessary-2
predicative sentence; he is concerned with showing that (at least some kinds
of) per se attributes are necessarily attributed to their subjects (73b16–18).
But from this it does not follow that Aristotle is talking about the same no-
tion of Necessity-2 in the rst paragraph of APo I.4, when he points out that
since the object of demonstrative knowledge is necessary, “demonstration
is, then, a syllogism from necessary [items]” (73a24). e adjective trans-
lated as “necessary” at 73a24 has no noun attached to it, and one might be
tempted to assume that Aristotle is talking about predicative sentences as
mere predicative sentences26—as if he focused on the mere predicative tie
between the subject and the predicate with no concern for the explanatory
role those sentences perform in a triadic context. Yet, such an assumption
goes beyond the direct evidence from the text. I admit that one cannot set-
tle whether Necessity-2 or Necessity-3 is evoked in the key sentence at 73a24
from a purely grammatical standpoint.e decision between one or another
kind of necessity should be grounded on the philosophical interpretation of
the surrounding context. Now, since commitment to Necessity-2 leads to
BFP and since commitment toNecessity-3 will furnish a good argument that
26 See (Barnes 1993, 111), (McKirahan 1992, 80–83).
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also squares with the context of 73a24, I submit that the “necessary [items]”
at 73a24 are necessary-3 principles. Aristotle’s point, then, is the following:
he stresses that demonstration requires necessary-3 principles (“demonstra-
tion is, then, a syllogism from necessary [items]”, 73a24), and then goes on
to discuss which sorts of predicates are involved in a necessary-3 principle
(“we must settle, then, from what items, i.e., from what kind of items [sc.
from what kind of predicate] demonstrations proceed”, 73a24–25). Being
necessarily-2 true of its subject is a sine qua non, but not a sucient condi-
tion for being a necessary-3 principle; actually, several further requirements
which go beyond Necessity-2 are made in APo I.4–5.
Now, one might argue that Aristotle is appealing to the notion of Neces-
sity-2 in his denition of scientic knowledge, but this is controversial.e
key passage is this:
(T2) We thinkwe have scientic knowledge of something simpliciter [. . . ] when
we think we know of the cause because of which the explanandum holds
that it is its cause, and also that it is not possible for it to be otherwise”
(71b9–12, Barnes’s translation modied).
Scholars have assumed that the pronoun “it” (touto) refers back to “pragma”
(explanandum, 71b11) and that pragma should be represented as amere pred-
icative sentence. However, we can get a much better sense if we understand
“touto” as referring back to the phrase “hoti ekeinou aitia esti” (“that [the
cause] is the cause of it”). What cannot be otherwise—and what we under-
stand that cannot be otherwise if we have scientic knowledge—is that the
cause [sc. the one picked up in our demonstration] is indeed the [sc. most
appropriate] cause of the pragma.27 us, Aristotle can be seen as dening
scientic knowledge precisely by this strong requirement about causes (in
the Aristotelian sense of “cause”): even if there are many causes that some-
how explain our explanandum, there is only one cause that explains it in the
most appropriate way, and we only attain scientic knowledge if we attain
the most appropriate cause for our explanandum.28 Such an interpretation
of Aristotle’s denition of scientic knowledge agrees perfectly with the no-
tion of a necessary-3 principle as described in my previous sections.
As for Aristotle’s talk of necessity inAPo I.6, it is far from clear that Aris-
totle is talking about Necessity-2 throughout the chapter. I have already ar-
gued that T1 is the best evidence against restricting ourselves to Necessity-2
27 “Aition” (with no adjective) means primary ormost appropriate cause in several passages:
78a26, 78b 15, 17, 98b17 (and many other occurrences in APo II. 16).
28is notion of scientic knowledge is too strict, too demanding etc., but Aristotle was
perfectly aware of it and the diculties in attaining its requirements did not deter Aristotle
from holding it. See 76a26–30.
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in interpreting Aristotle’s theory of demonstration. A full discussion of this
vexing chapter is beyond the scope of this paper, but I will now argue that
a signicant number of key passages make better sense on my interpreta-
tion. Again, a decision about whether Necessity-2 or Necessity-3 is involved
in most of those passages cannot be settled on purely grammatical crite-
ria. I argue that Necessity-3 delivers a better understanding of Aristotle’s
philosophical point in those contexts. Let me consider the passage which
immediately follows T1:
(T3) ere is evidence that demonstrations proceed from necessary [items] in
the way in which we bring objections against those who think they are
demonstrating: we say that it is not necessary, if we think [. . . ] that it is
possible to be otherwise.” (74b18–21, Barnes’s translation modied)
It is precipitate to assume that the objection “it is not necessary” should
be understood as equivalent to “this is not a necessarily true sentence”. Aris-
totle’s words can be understood along the lines of Necessity-3. If someone
claims that “our economy is good because of the commodity prices”, it is
open to anyone to object “not necessarily”, meaning that “it is not primarily
because of the commodity prices that our economy is good”, since there are
better explanations for that explanandum (“why is our economy good?”); in
short, it is possible to explain the explanandum otherwise and in a better
manner. An objection of this sort can be paraphrased thus: “the commod-
ity prices are not the explanatory factor that provides the most appropriate
cause of our economy’s state”.29
29 Someone might object that my Necessity-3 introduces the notion of conditional necessity,
not the notion of absolute necessity. I do not believe that such an objection has a real
point against my claim.ere is some similarity between the logical structure underlying
both usages of the expression “necessary”.e similarity can be made explicit with a para-
phrase such as this: “(i) if there is to be an appropriate explanation of this explanandum,
then (ii) this is the principle necessary (for that explanation)”. (1) However, an uncautious
use of this paraphrase—as well as of what Aristotle says about conditional necessity in
Metaphysics 1015b10, namely, that, in the case of things which are conditionally necessary,
“the cause by which it is necessary is another thing”—will lead to a mistaken inversion in
the grounding or explanatory order. It is true to say that our concern for attaining the
appropriate explanation is what makes the necessary principle necessary for us or for our
scientic knowledge. But even if nobody had ever realised the desirability to attain appro-
priate explanations, the real-world relation between the fact to be explained and its cause
would still be there—independently of us—and the grounding connection between them
would still be one from explanans (premises) to explanandum (conclusion), but not the
other way around. Now, this means that the grounding relation goes from (ii) to (i): what
is captured as a necessary-3 principle is what makes our explanation turn out to be the
most appropriate one. Now, in the most conspicuous appeals to conditional necessity (in
natural teleology and in ethical reasoning), the grounding order is rather from (i) to (ii):
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Further, passage at 74b21–26 will be in harmony with its immediate con-
text if understood along Necessity-3: Aristotle’s point is that acceptable or
even true sentences are not enough for being principles. Principlesmust also
be primary and appropriate. And the notion of “what is [most] appropriate”
(oikeion, 74b26) is precisely what I am trying to depict as a necessary-3 prin-
ciple, whose main feature is to capture what exactly its explanandum is as
such. Appealing here to Necessity-2 would turn this passage into a “curious
aside” (Barnes 1993, 126), not in harmony with its context.
3.6 Compatibility with “For the Most Part” Sentences
Another advantage of the triadic notion of a necessary principle is that it is
also compatible with a demonstrative sentence being true for the most part
(87b21–25, 96a8–19). Now, most (if not all) natural sciences for Aristotle
seem to operate with sentences of this sort. Hence, themain source of the al-
leged mismatch between Aristotle’s theory of demonstrative knowledge and
Aristotle’s real practice in the eld of natural sciences will simply vanish on
my account. Each sentence belonging to a natural sciencemight well be true
only for the most part (such as “every sheep has four legs”). But this does
not prevent the middle term from being the necessary principle in the tri-
adic sense: thismiddle termwill be the required one for the fully appropriate
explanation of why (say) sheeps have four legs (for the most part).
4. Explaining Xrough X’s Essence
WhenAristotle introduces his triadicmodel of explanation inAPo, he claims
that knowing the “what it is” is the same as knowing “why it is” (90a14–15;
93a4). If we grant that knowingwhy it is in this context is tantamount to hav-
the desire for an end is the ground for the desirability of the means; the structure of a
house is the ground for the wall’s being there etc. (2) Besides, the notion of “conditional
necessity” introduced atMetaphysics 1015a20–26 seems to accommodate only conditions
which are necessary but not sucient for a desired result (“sunaitia”), whereas my notion
of “necessary-3 principle” refers to items which are necessary and sucient for the fully
appropriate explanation. (3) Furthermore, this similarity highlighted above is not ne-
grained enough to capture one important aspect of my claim, which is the shi from a
dyadic to a triadic-explanatory structure. Conditional necessity might still be used as a
dierent way of understanding how a given sentence turns out to be necessary in the sense
of a necessarily true proposition, but whatmost concernsme is that a “necessary principle”
is called necessary not because of its being a necessarily true proposition, but because of
its explanatory power in relation to an explanandum cast in a syllogistic framework.us,
there are manymore usages of “necessity/necessary” terminology in Aristotle’s Greek than
what is covered by the rough bipolarity between absolute and conditional necessity (see,
e.g., Topics 155b19, 20, 29, 36; 156a10; 157a12; 159a20; and Prior Analytics 42a39; 47a19; 53a35;
66a36: Aristotle introduces the notion of premises required for an intended conclusion).
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ing scientic knowledge, and that knowing what X is amounts to knowing
X’s essence, Aristotle’s claim implies that scientic knowledge of X (“why X
is”) is the same as the knowledge of X’s essence (“what X is”): this implied
claim can be encapsulated in the lemma “explaining X through X’s essence”.
Now, there are two ways of understanding the lemma “explaining X
through X’s essence” in the threefold model of explanation. An explanan-
dum is introducible by a nominal expression which packs the predicative
relation between C and A.30 Let X be that nominal expression.us, to use
one of Aristotle’s favourite examples, the phenomenon which results from
noise of a certain type (A) being attributed to clouds (C) is presented un-
der the name “thunder” (= X).31 With “X” standing for the explanandum as
such, explaining X through X’s essence will follow what I call Version A of
the lemma, which has the following distinctive features:
(a) emiddle term B is introduced either as the essence of the X-term,
or as the essence of theA-term, but not as the essence of theC-term.
(b) eA-term, even if it is a necessary feature ofC, is not appropriately
explained by C’s essence.
Version A is implied in all those passages and examples I have discussed in
section 3, and commitment to the notion of a necessary-3 principle, which is
explanandum-sensitive, is tantamount to commitment to Version A. Before
discussing Version A in more detail, let me present Version B, which can be
characterized by the following distinctive features:32
(a*) e middle term B is introduced as the essence of the C-term.
(b*) e A-term is introduced as a necessary feature of C, to be appro-
priately explained by C’s essence.
In Version B, the lemma “explaining X through X’s essence” is under-
stood in such a way that the role of “X” is played by the C-term, not by
the pragma CA or by the attribute A. Version B is the one standardly ac-
knowledged by contemporary discussions of essentialism. For instance, in
30 See (Charles 2000, 64–67, 198–213), (Charles 2010, 289–292).
31 At the end of the story, questions of the form “why does it thunder” must be rephrased
not into “why does thunder occur in the clouds” (see 90a3, 93a30, with the parallel case
of “eclipse”), but rather into “why does noise (of a certain type) occur in the clouds” See
Metaphysics 1041a23–26, APo 93b10–12. See (Williams and Charles 2013, 123), (Charles
2000, 283–294), (Lewis 2013, 276–277).
32 See (Charles 2000, 245–265), (Williams and Charles 2013, 123–124). Version B is the one
standardly acknowledged by contemporary discussions of essentialism, for instance (Fine
1994). I urge that Version A must be taken into account as well for attaining a more ne-
grained understanding of the explanatory role of essences.
Lucas Angioni 105
Fine’s discussions, essences, as what determine the identity of their objects,
are also the grounds in virtue of which a collection of other features belongs
to those objects.33 Fine distinguishes between what belongs strictly to the
essence of an object, its constitutive essence, and what follows from it—its
consequential essence. Several issues might be addressed here and many
details might be described with more exactitude, but for my purposes it is
enough to highlight that Fine’s picture seems to t into Version B better than
into Version A: an object (the essence-bearer) plays the role of the C-term,
the constitutive essence plays the role of the B-term and the consequential
essence plays the role of the A-term. Now, both Versions can be claimed to
be found in Aristotle’s text, but preferences for Version B have almost led
Version A to be overlooked. My concern is to defend Version A against this
oversight. I have argued that what Aristotle says about necessary principles
in APo commits him to Version A; I will now argue that Version A gives us
an important standpoint for the essentialism debate: it stands against the
idea that the Necessity-2 of a property is what makes that property essential
to its subject and explanatory of its features.
Essentialism is oen construed as a view in which the essentiality of a
given property P either ows from or is identical with its Necessity-2. e
essence of an object is taken to be the set of properties that an object pos-
sesses in every possible world in which it exists. On this construal, the ex-
planatoriness of the essence will also depend on its necessity; for it is only by
pertaining to its object in every possible world that an essence would be able
to explain anything about that object.34 Now, recent discussions have made
a powerful case against such a construal.35 Philosophers have argued that it
is rather the essentiality of a property P that grounds not only its necessarily
belonging to its subject, but also the Necessity-2 of other necessary features
of the same subject. us, on this account, it is by being essential that an
essential property belongs necessarily to its subject,36 but not the other way
around; and it is by being essential that an essential property grounds and
explains why its subject must have a necessary property.
Now, it might seem at rst glance that my view runs against this picture,
since my Version A acknowledges an explanatory property B that, on the
one hand, is not the essence of a given subject C, but, on the other hand,
explains why C has a given necessary property A.us, one might say that,
33 (Fine 1994, 3–5), (Fine 1995, 275–280).
34is is the standard picture of essentialism made popular by Quine. Lowe (2008, 34) has
convincingly pointed out that this wrong construal of essentialism is shared by many of
the contemporary anti-Quinean essentialists.
35 (Fine 1994), (Lowe 2008, 45), (Peramatzis 2011, 309–311), (Koslicki 2012).
36 See discussion in (Williams and Charles 2013, 127–131).
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on Version A, it is not by being essential (to C) that property B explains why
its subject C must have the necessary property A. However, this is a wrong
impression. My account still supports the basic claim that essentiality is in-
trinsically interrelated with explanatoriness and grounds the Necessity-2 of
necessary properties. First, it is by being essential (not to C, but to the ex-
planandum as such) that property B explains why its subject C has property
A; besides, a necessary-3 principle, even without being the essence of C, is
still related to it (I will shortly explain how this is so).
Consider again one of my previous examples of a necessary-3 principle
and its foil. In order to make reference easier, I will identify the B- and A-
termswith numerical indexes (Iwill also supply a description forwhatwould
be the essence of being mortal):
C = human;
B1 = being rational animal;
B2 = having vital functions depending ultimately on an unstable
mixture of the four elements;
A1 = being capable of becoming literate;
A2 = being mortal
I have argued that A2 is appropriately explained by B2 and that A1 is ap-
propriately explained by B1. Now, an attempt to explain A1 by means of B2
will be uncontroversially a failure (since the major premise of the syllogism
will be false), while an attempt to explain A2 through B1 will deliver some
explanation, but not themost appropriate one, which uniquely counts as the
scientic explanation simpliciter. However, this last case will not aect the
appropriateness of explaining A1 by means of B1. e fact that B1 does not
deliver the most appropriate explanation for A2 does not aect the appro-
priateness of B1 for the full explanation of A1. I submit that this point can be
generalised: for any given property such as B1, which is essential to C, there
are necessary properties such as A1 which are appropriately explained by B1
even if B1 is not the principle necessary-3 for the fully appropriate explana-
tion of other properties A2, An etc. A similar story holds for the other case
as well: any given property such as B2 is the principle necessary-3 for the
fully appropriate explanation of a property such as A2, but there are many
necessary properties Ax , An etc. of the same subject C (e.g., capable of be-
coming literate) which are not appropriately explained by B2. In both cases,
it is by being essential that a property Bx explains why its subject C has some
other property Ax .e dierence is that B1 is essential to its subject C, while
B2 is essential to the attribute A2. Essences are still at the core of scientic
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explanations in both cases: the worry about my approach running against
this point is not well founded.
It is important at this juncture to stress thatVersionsA andB are far from
being incompatible or unconnected with each other. I will take upmy previ-
ous examples to show this. A property such as A2 is appropriately explained
by B2, which is not the essence of their subject, C. However, the explana-
tory property B2 is not unrelated to C’s essence. e important idea is that
B2 is connected with B1 at some point. Having vital functions depending
ultimately on an unsteady mixture of the four elements is something en-
tailed by being a rational animal. I would say that the relation between B1
and B2 might be described as similar to Fine’s relation between constitutive
essence and restricted consequential essence.ere are obvious dierences,
of course (for Fine’s notion of restricted consequential essence has no refer-
ence to something like the essence of the attribute to be explained), but my
purpose is just to highlight the entailment relation between the relata. In
this way, inasmuch as B1 is the essence of C and B1 entails B2, B1 furnishes
some ground for C’s having the property A2. is, however, must not lead
us to conclude that B1 will be thereby the most appropriate explanatory fac-
tor for A2. If I am correct, the notion of a necessary-3 principle involves
uniqueness—for each explanandum CAx , there is only one principle neces-
sary for the most appropriate explanation—and this by itself shows that the
relation of “being the necessary-3 principle of ” is not transitive.
5. Discussion of Some Objections
One might object that my approach seems to inate the population of
essence-bearers. Aristotle’s metaphysics seems to acknowledge only sub-
stances as primary essence-bearers, and even if the exibility of his model
for scientic explanation seems to make room for some attributes as (sec-
ondary) essence-bearers, it would be too much to say that any pragma ar-
ticulated in a predicative tie, like human’s being mortal, will be an essence-
bearer as well.
Against this worry, I start by answering that the introduction of these
essence-bearers is grounded in Aristotle’s text. e notion of essence I am
talking about here is what Aristotle introduces with his expressions “what
X is” (to ti esti) and “what it is to be X” (to ti e¯n einai).37. Now, Aristotle
talks about what thunder is, and what he says at 93a12–13 implies that to ti e¯n
einai should be ascribed to thunder. Consequently, thunder has an essence
37 See 90a15 ., 90b30, 92a 34–35, 93a4 (for “to ti esti”); and 91a25–26, b8, 26, 92a13, 93a12–13,
94a21 (for “to ti en einai”). Sometimes Aristotle uses ousia to introduce the same notion
(90b30–31; 91b9, 27; 92a34, b14; 96a34).
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at least in the sense in which essence corresponds to what is presented as an
explanatory answer to the question “what is it?” and the notion of essence
in APo seems to be nothing more than that. I do not mean that “essence” in
APo stands for what is given in any sensible and enlightening answer to the
question “what is it?”. In order to display an essence, the explanatory answer
must pick out the cause (in the Aristotelian sense) that makes the thing what
it is and, therefore, fully accounts for its identity and its unity.
Another important qualication is due here: “thunder” is a name for the
phenomenon articulated as the occurrence of certain type of noise in the
clouds due to a certain regular and traceable cause. us, it is not that any
pragma able to be articulated in a predication will be an essence-bearer, for
it will be an essence-bearer only if the predicative tie at stake does have a reg-
ular cause. Now, if thunder—precisely as able to be articulated as the occur-
rence of certain feature in a given subject due to a certain regular cause—has
an essence, why would any other phenomenon of the same type not have an
essence as well?
e issue hinges on Aristotle’s treatment of substance and essence in
Metaphysics VII. Many scholars believe that Aristotle is arguing in Meta-
physics VII that only substances are essence-bearers (or at least that only
substances are the primary essence-bearers) and that accidental compounds
such as pale man do not have essences.ere is no room for a careful con-
sideration of these issues within this paper, but it should be noted that those,
who believe that Aristotle is restricting the population of essence-bearers in
Metaphysics VII, must say something about Aristotle’s treatment of essence
in APo, where Aristotle’s talk of essence and explanation of X by means of
X’s essence implies that regular events like thunder are acknowledged as
essence-bearers. Aristotle does not show any interest in arguing that thun-
der’s essence should be reduced to a substance’s essence; nor does Aristotle
argue that “thunder” has only a nominal denition. Quite on the contrary,
he seems committed to the idea that thunder has a real essence which plays a
major role in the scientic explanation of thunder. Now, much in this debate
depends on whether essences are taken as entities themselves.38 ose who
are worried about pragmata as essence-bearers seem to favour a positive an-
swer. However, at least in APo, Aristotle’s notion of essence can be taken
to imply a negative answer: far from being new entities introduced in the
38 For recent discussion about this topic, see (Lowe 2008, 34, 39), (Lowe 2013, 203), (Tahko
2013, 56–60). Code (1985, 110–113, 119) ascribes to Aristotle the view that an object X (of
a proper kind) is the same as its own essence, which implies that essences are not intro-
duced as new entities in the furniture of the world. Against this view, Charles (2011) has
objected that identity with its bearer will prevent essences from having their explanatory
and grounding role.
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furniture of the world, essences are just what their bearers exactly are. De-
nitions, as the linguistic counterparts of essences, do not introduce dierent
entities, but just say how exactly and why exactly their bearers are what they
are.39 Essences might be such that their full specication involves reference
to other entities.us, thunder’s essence involves reference to clouds and to
re; eclipse’s essence involves reference to the Moon and to the Earth. But
being fully speciable only by reference to other entities does not imply that
essences are entities themselves.
6. Conclusion
I have argued thatAristotle’s notion of a necessary principle in hisAPo should
not be understood in terms of a necessarily true sentence. A necessary prin-
ciple should rather be understood in terms of explanatory appropriateness:
a necessary principle is the principle that is strictly necessary for the fully ap-
propriate explanation of a given explanandum. I have argued that this notion
has philosophical advantages in its favour: it allows us a more ne-grained
understanding of the exact factor on which the most appropriate explana-
tion of a given explanandum depends. I have also argued that this notion of
a necessary principle is in tune with recent developments in the essential-
ism debate as it promotes the idea that necessary properties are grounded
in essential properties but not the other way around. Furthermore, from
an exegetical standpoint, my account has the advantage of making sense of
Aristotle’s talk about “necessary [items]” in APo without charging him with
false propositions like BFP: “If P is inferred from Π, and Π is necessary,
then P is demonstrated”. At a rst glance, Aristotle seems to be commit-
ted to BFP in T1 (74b15–18). Such a commitment would be helpful to those
who believe that not only Aristotle, but philosophers in general, are right in
claiming that Necessity-2 is the basic ground to which the explanatoriness
and the essentiality of a property should be reduced. However, I have shown
that Necessity-3 cannot be reduced to Necessity-2 and cannot even be un-
derstood in terms of it. Aristotle does not say in T1 (74b15–18) that necessary
predicative ties are by themselves the ground for scientic explanation and
thereby (granting that scientic explanation appeals to essences) the ground
for essences. Aristotle never endorsed BFP: “If P is inferred from Π, and Π
is necessary, then P is demonstrated”. So much the better for Aristotle and
39 Lowe (2008, 46) ascribes an essence to the event death of Socrates (as well as to other kinds
of things) and I think he is right in doing that. I will not address the question whether
Aristotle will go so far as to say with Tahko (2013, 56) that “non-existent entities can have
essences” or “every metaphysically possible entity must have an essence”. But I just want
to point out that the acknowledgment of pragmata as essence-bearers in APo cannot be
ignored and is a defensible and interesting philosophical view.
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much better for us.
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